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ATKINS V. PARKER: MAXIMIZING TREATMENT IN A “CRUEL
WORLD” OF LIMITED RESOURCES OR MINIMIZING
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS?

EMILY MCGOWAN*

In Atkins v. Parker, the Sixth Circuit addressed whether the chief medical
director of the Tennessee Department of Corrections (TDOC) was liable for
deliberate indifference to inmates’ chronic hepatitis C (HCV) needs under his
overhauled 2019 HCV Guidance.1 In sole consideration of whether the chief
medical director’s failure to provide direct-acting antivirals (DAAs) to every
infected inmate in the Tennessee system violated the Eighth Amendment, the
Court held that the chief medical director’s 2019 HCV Guidance sought to best
maximize treatment in a world of “finite” resources, and thus did not violate the
Eighth Amendment.2 By upholding the TDOC prioritization scheme, the Sixth
Circuit incorrectly disregarded the serious medical needs of prisoners and
modern professional medical guidance.3 The Court has also dangerously signaled
that state prisons that prioritize HCV treatment amongst prisoners due to funding
restrictions will likely prevail against an Eighth Amendment claim using an
inadequate resources defense.4 In response, state legislatures must take action to
protect the health and safety of their incarcerated populations.5
I. THE CASE
Atkins v. Parker is a class action suit of Tennessee prisoners who
challenged TDOC policies concerning the medical treatment for state inmates
diagnosed with HCV.6 The class sued two TDOC officials, the Commissioner,
©2022 Emily McGowan
* J.D. 2022, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. I would like to thank the editors
from the Journal of Health Care Law and Policy for their extensive review and constructive feedback. I
dedicate this Note to my family and friends for their enthusiasm, encouragement, and support throughout
this journey.
1. Atkins v. Parker, 972 F.3d 734, 736–37 (6th Cir. 2020), cert. denied sub nom. Atkins v. Williams,
141 S. Ct. 2512 (2021) (mem.).
2. Id. at 739–40.
3. See infra Section IV.A.
4. See infra Section IV.B.
5. See infra Section IV.C.
6. Atkins v. Parker, 412 F. Supp. 3d 761, 764 (M.D. Tenn. 2019), aff’d, 972 F.3d 734 (6th Cir.
2020).
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Tony Parker, and the Medical Director, Dr. Kenneth Williams (Dr. Williams).7
The plaintiffs alleged that the “officials acted with deliberate indifference to the
class’s serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
on cruel and unusual punishment.”8 This section will first provide background
information on HCV and explain the current medical standard for treatment.9
Then, this section will explain the changes in TDOC HCV policies, which
occurred after the prisoners initiated litigation.10 Finally, the section will briefly
summarize the lower court’s holding.11
A. Background Information on HCV
HCV is a progressive virus that spreads through contact with bodily fluids
containing contagious blood.12 It can cause two types of infections—acute or
chronic.13 When the infection is acute, a person may have symptoms for up to
six months, but the person’s body is able to fight off the infection.14 If the body
does not fight off the infection after six months, the infection becomes chronic.15
Although some infected persons recover from an acute infection, about 75 to
85% of people will develop chronic HCV and, unless treated, may remain
infected for life.16
Over time, the virus progressively scars the liver, causing it to deteriorate,
which can lead to cirrhosis17 and liver cancer.18 The rate of liver scarring, known

7. Atkins, 972 F.3d at 736.
8. Id.
9. See infra Section I.A.
10. See infra Section I.B.
11. See infra Section I.C.
12. Atkins, 972 F.3d at 736; see generally Hepatitis C Questions and Answers for Health
Professionals, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/hepatitis/
hcv/hcvfaq.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2020) [hereinafter Hepatitis C Questions and Answers] (addressing
general questions about HCV transmission). Most commonly, HCV is transmitted through injection-drug
use, sharing of personal items with bodily fluids on them (like razors or toothbrushes), unsterilized tools
or inks used for tattooing or piercing, and unprotected sex. Hepatitis C Questions and Answers, supra note
12; see also Hepatitis C, NAT’L INST. DIABETES & DIGESTIVE & KIDNEY DISEASES, https://www.niddk.
nih.gov/health-information/liver-disease/viral-hepatitis/hepatitis-c (last updated Mar. 2020) [hereinafter
Hepatitis C] (explaining common modes of transmission for HCV).
13. Hepatitis C, supra note 12.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See Atkins, 972 F.3d at 736 (noting that between 15 to 25% of infected persons recover from
acute infection); Hepatitis C, supra note 12.
17. Cirrhosis, NAT’L INST. DIABETES & DIGESTIVE & KIDNEY DISEASES, https://www.niddk.nih.
gov/health-information/liver-disease/cirrhosis (last visited Jan. 14, 2022). Cirrhosis is a condition where
the “liver is scarred and permanently damaged.” Id. As the condition progresses, scar tissue replaces
normal tissue and prevents the liver from working normally. Id. It eventually leads to liver failure. Id. Of
cases that reach the chronic stage, 20 to 40% of people develop cirrhosis. Atkins, 972 F.3d at 736.
18. Atkins, 972 F.3d at 736.
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as fibrosis, varies from person to person.19 To measure the degree of fibrosis,
doctors use a five-point score: F0 (no fibrosis), F1 (mild fibrosis), F2 (moderate
fibrosis), F3 (advanced fibrosis), and F4 (cirrhosis).20 As the disease progresses,
some HCV-infected patients may develop symptoms, including fatigue,
depression, jaundice, nausea, severe inflammation, skin lesions, and cognitive
impairment.21 However, many patients, including those with severe scarring,
remain asymptomatic.22 The possible lack of symptoms increases the importance
of finding the disease and treating it early.23 Unless tested, people who are HCVpositive may not know of their condition for decades.24
No vaccine currently exists for HCV.25 Prior to 2011, the standard treatment
for chronic HCV involved injections of a drug called interferon.26 This treatment
had low success rates, severe side effects, and the treatment process took a long
time.27 In 2011, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration approved a new
treatment for HCV: DAAs.28 DAAs are taken as a pill once a day for eight to
twelve weeks, have minimal side effects, and have an incredible success rate of
over ninety percent.29 DAAs are so effective that “interferon treatment for HCV
[has been] effectively abandoned.”30 Despite their success, DAAs remain very
expensive.31 For instance, during the Atkins trial in 2019, the price per single
course of treatment was between $13,000 and $32,000.32
B. TDOC Changes to 2016 HCV Guidance
When the Atkins plaintiffs brought their suit, TDOC operated under its 2016
HCV Guidance.33 The 2016 Guidance “specified that [TDOC] would provide the
19. Id.; see generally Assessment of Liver Fibrosis, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFFS.,
https://www.hepatitis.va.gov/hcv/liver-fibrosis.asp (last updated Oct. 23, 2018) [hereinafter Assessment
of Liver Fibrosis] (describing fibrosis progression).
20. Atkins, 412 F. Supp. 3d at 766; see generally Assessment of Liver Fibrosis, supra note 19
(describing fibrosis progression).
21. Atkins, 972 F.3d at 736; see also Hepatitis C, supra note 12 (describing symptoms of HCV).
22. Atkins, 412 F. Supp. 3d at 766; Hepatitis C, supra note 12.
23. See Hepatitis C, supra note 12 (explaining the importance of screening for finding and treating
HCV early).
24. Hepatitis C, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (July 27, 2021) https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/
detail/hepatitis-c [hereinafter WHO, Hepatitis C].
25. Atkins, 972 F.3d at 736.
26. Atkins, 412 F. Supp. 3d at 767.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.; Hepatitis C Questions and Answers, supra note 12 (“Over 90% of people infected with
hepatitis C virus (HCV) can be cured of their infection . . . with 8–12 weeks of oral therapy.”).
30. Atkins, 412 F. Supp. 3d at 767.
31. Atkins, 972 F.3d at 736.
32. See id. at 736–37 (noting that, in 2019, approximately 4,740 of 21,000 TDOC inmates had known
HCV infections).
33. Id.

MCGOWAN 05 (DO NOT DELETE)

5/21/22 8:14 PM

316

[VOL. 25:2

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

antivirals only to infected inmates with severe liver scarring.”34 Therefore,
inmates in lower fibrosis stages were completely barred from antiviral
treatment.35 In 2019, during Atkins litigation, TDOC amended its 2016 Guidance
to reflect the prevalence of HCV amongst its incarcerated population and the
decreasing costs of DAAs.36 Afterwards, both sides of the litigation agreed to
focus solely on the amended guidance.37
The 2019 HCV Guidance controls “the testing, evaluation, staging,
prioritization, treatment, and monitoring of TDOC inmates with chronic HCV.”38
The goal of the 2019 Guidance was to provide the best treatment in a costeffective manner for the greatest number of prisoners.39 This policy continued
the prioritization of treating the sickest people first (those in the F3 and F4 stages)
but opened the door to the possibility of also treating people at lower fibrosis
stages (those in the F1 and F2 stages).40 These protocols became the baseline for
all providers within the TDOC system—deviations from the 2019 Guidelines
could only happen with the permission of Dr. Williams.41
TDOC implemented four major changes with the 2019 Guidance to better
address the needs of inmates diagnosed with HCV. The first major change was
the adoption of an “opt-out,” as opposed to an “opt-in” testing policy.42 At intake,
TDOC requires inmates to be tested for HCV unless they specifically make an
informed refusal to “opt-out.”43 If an inmate tests positive, the individual
undergoes a baseline evaluation and medical providers assess the best treatment
regime for that patient.44
The second major change requires consideration of all HCV-diagnosed
inmates for DAA treatment regardless of fibrosis stage, but prioritizes DAA
treatment for those in the most advanced stages.45 By contrast, the 2016 HCV
Guidance limited DAA treatment eligibility only to inmates in severe stages of

34. Id. at 737.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 738.
38. Atkins, 412 F. Supp. 3d at 771.
39. Id. at 770–71.
40. Id. at 771–72.
41. Id. at 771. The TDOC system includes both private and state-operated facilities. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. Upon a refusal of treatment, the health care provider “must advise the inmate of the potential
health consequences of [the] refusal.” STATE OF TENN. DEP’T OF CORRS., 113.51, CONSENT/REFUSAL OF
TREATMENT 5 (2019). After, the inmate signs a Refusal of Medical Services that demonstrates that he or
she has been advised of these consequences. Id. The individual maintains the right to later change his or
her mind and accept the treatment. Id. at 6.
44. Atkins, 412 F. Supp. 3d at 771. For the baseline evaluation, medical providers conduct a physical
examination and collect the patient’s history to determine the likely date of infection, other causes of liver
disease, symptoms, past HCV treatment, and the patient’s stage of fibrosis. Id. at 771–72.
45. Atkins, 412 F. Supp. 3d at 772.
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fibrosis.46 This 2019 HCV Guidance structure is similar to the U.S. Bureau of
Prisons (BOP) 2018 HCV Guidance, which also classified patients with priority
based on the inmate’s stage of fibrosis.47 Notably, BOP’s 2018 Guidance
references the American Association for the Study of Liver Diseases (AASLD)
and the Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA) HCV guidance in its
policy recommendations.48
Most medical providers in the U.S. who treat HCV follow the
AASLD/IDSA guidance.49 This guidance is considered the “best practice”—the
medical standard of care—for the treatment of HCV.50 At the time of the Atkins
trial, AASLD/IDSA guidance recommended early treatment to all diagnosed
patients with DAAs, but provided that prioritization to treat those with the
greatest risk of complications was permissible in circumstances of limited
resources.51 AASLD/IDSA later altered their standards to recommend that all
patients with HCV be treated, except those with a short life expectancy, and that
medical providers treat patients early in the course of the disease.52
The third major change was the installment of a medical committee—
TDOC Advisory Committee on HIV and Viral Hepatitis Prevention and
Treatment (TACHH)—that provides individualized assessments and ongoing

46. Id.
47. Id. at 773–74; see also FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, EVALUATION AND MANAGEMENT OF CHRONIC
HEPATITIS C VIRUS (HCV) INFECTION 2, 8–10 (2018) [hereinafter BOP 2018 GUIDANCE] (recommending
an “opt out” approach to testing and DAA treatment, with the caveat that “when more than one regimen
is appropriate for an individual case, the most cost-effective regiment is recommended,” and establishing
priority criteria “to ensure that inmates with greatest need are identified and treated first”); U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM: FY 2020 PERFORMANCE BUDGET CONGRESSIONAL SUBMISSION 23
(2019) (“The most recent update to hepatitis treatment guidance recommends treatment of all inmates
testing positive for HCV.”). In 2021, after the Atkins decision, BOP made “major revisions” to its HCV
guidance. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, EVALUATION AND MANAGEMENT OF CHRONIC HEPATITIS C VIRUS
(HCV) INFECTION 1 (2021) [hereinafter BOP 2021 GUIDANCE]. Of these major revisions, BOP removed
its priority level recommendations based on fibrosis score and now simply recommends considering all
HCV-diagnosed inmates for the most appropriate and “cost-effective” DAA regimen. Id. at 12, 15–16.
48. BOP 2018 GUIDANCE, supra note 47, at i (“Recommended HCV treatment regimens have been
updated to reflect the current guidance from the American Association for the Study of Liver Diseases.”).
49. Atkins, 412 F. Supp. 3d at 768; see generally Introduction, in HCV Guidance: Recommendations
for Testing, Managing, and Treating Hepatitis C, AM. ASS’N FOR THE STUDY OF LIVER DISEASE &
INFECTIOUS DISEASES SOC’Y OF AM., https://www.hcvguidelines.org/contents/welcome (last updated
Nov. 6, 2019) (describing role of web-based processes in medical community).
50. Atkins, 412 F. Supp. 3d at 768.
51. Id. at 774.
52. See When and in Whom to Initiate HCV Therapy, in HCV Guidance: Recommendations for
Testing, Managing, and Treating Hepatitis C, AM. ASS’N FOR THE STUDY OF LIVER DISEASE &
INFECTIOUS DISEASES SOC’Y OF AM., https://www.hcvguidelines.org/evaluate/when-whom (last updated
Nov. 6, 2019) (suggesting that successfully treating patients with a low fibrosis score resulted in a better
long-term survival rate).
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monitoring of all HCV cases and approves treatment in each case.53 Finally, the
fourth major change included a HCV treatment workflow outline, which advises
all health care providers within the TDOC system on how to implement these
guidelines.54
To properly implement the 2019 HCV guidelines, TDOC required
additional funding.55 Throughout the course of the 2016–2017 and 2017–2018
legislative years, TDOC had secured recurring funds of $4.6 million for DAA
treatment.56 For the 2019–2020 fiscal year, TDOC, at Dr. William’s request,
obtained a one-time allocation of $26.4 million for DAAs.57 Of the 4,740
Tennessee inmates diagnosed with HCV, Dr. Williams believed that the funding
secured for the 2019–2020 fiscal year could provide treatment for approximately
1,800 to 1,900 inmates.58
C. The Lower Court Opinion and its Procedural Posture
In 2016, Gregory Atkins and his fellow plaintiffs sought prospective
injunctive and declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Tony Parker and
Dr. Kenneth Williams.59 The Section 1983 claim provides a federal cause of
action against government officials who, while acting under the color of state
law, deprived the plaintiffs of rights secured by the U.S. Constitution.60 Here,
plaintiffs alleged that they were deprived adequate treatment for their serious
medical needs under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.61 More
specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the prioritization approach used in the
2016, and subsequently 2019, TDOC HCV Guidance constituted deliberate
indifference because the protocols failed to reach the current medical standards
of care and subjected HCV-positive inmates to a substantial risk of harm or
death.62
The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee held that
neither Parker nor Dr. Williams was liable for deliberate indifference under the
Eighth Amendment.63 In Parker’s case, the court found that the plaintiffs had

53. See Atkins, 412 F. Supp. 3d at 772–74 (explaining that TACHH meets regularly to assess each
HCV-diagnosed patient and sets treatment priority based on several factors including fibrosis stage and
symptoms).
54. See id. at 774–75 (explaining that the workflow sets the expectations and steps for how health
care providers must test, diagnose, prioritize, treat, and monitor inmates with HCV).
55. Id. at 783.
56. Id. at 777.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 765, 777.
59. Id. at 764.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
61. Atkins, 412 F. Supp. 3d at 764.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 764–65. See infra Section II.A.
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failed to establish that Parker was liable because he had no involvement in the
administration of HCV policies nor did he have a sufficiently culpable state of
mind.64 Because Parker had no medical training or medical knowledge and relied
exclusively on TDOC medical health care professionals for the creation and
implementation of the HCV 2019 Guidance, the court found that he could not
possess a mental state that exceeded the necessary bar of gross negligence.65
The lower court also dismissed the case against Dr. Williams.66 Although
the court found that HCV constituted a “serious medical condition,” Dr.
Williams’ new 2019 Guidance met constitutional obligations because the
guidance “serve[d] the dual goals of maximizing and prioritizing treatment for
[infected] inmates.”67 Because Dr. Williams took precautions in his guidance that
were “not so unreasonable or so contrary to medical standards that no competent
medical professional would make similar choices” with the limited resources
available to TDOC, the court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to meet their
burden.68 The plaintiffs appealed this decision to the Sixth Circuit.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Eighth Amendment protects against the infliction of “cruel and unusual
punishments.”69 The U.S. Supreme Court has understood the Eighth Amendment
to embody “broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards,
humanity, and decency . . . against which [it] evaluate[s] penal measures.”70 As
society’s standards of decency evolve, the standards of what constitutes “cruel”
and “unusual” do too.71 These principles underly the government’s obligation to
provide medical care to incarcerated individuals.72 Due to the prisoner’s reliance
on the government for medical services, the government is obligated to provide
adequate medical care to prevent pain and suffering that serves no penological
purpose.73 Section II explores the Eighth Amendment standard of deliberate
indifference. Section II.A explains the two-part analysis of the standard that
evolved from the U.S. Supreme Court case, Estelle v. Gamble.74 Section II.B

64. Id. at 780–81.
65. Id. at 781.
66. Id. at 785.
67. Id. at 781, 783.
68. Id. at 783.
69. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
70. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Jackson v.
Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)).
71. See id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S 86, 101 (1958)) (explaining that the Court has held
Eighth Amendment punishments that are incompatible with the “evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society” unconstitutional).
72. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.
73. Id.
74. See infra Section II.A.

MCGOWAN 05 (DO NOT DELETE)

5/21/22 8:14 PM

320

[VOL. 25:2

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

explores the application of the standard in circuit and district courts, particularly
in the context of HCV litigation.75 Finally, Section II.C describes the legal
background of the inadequate resources defense within the context of
constitutional claims.76
A. The “Deliberate Indifference” Standard
In Estelle v. Gamble, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that “deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain.”77 To bring a deliberate indifference claim, “a
prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs.”78 This “indifference” is what offends
society’s “evolving standards of decency in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.”79 Thus, certain claims of inadequate medical care—like accidents
or instances of medical malpractice—do not rise to a level of “wanton infliction
of unnecessary pain.”80 For example, the Estelle case involved a back injury that
Gamble, an inmate, suffered while unloading a truck.81 As the injury failed to
improve, Gamble consistently sought treatment from medical personnel for
several months but found that their prescriptions of pain relievers and bed rest
were inadequate to improve his injury.82 The Court held that Gamble had failed
to show that medical personnel exhibited deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs because he had been seen, diagnosed, and treated by medical
personnel on multiple occasions.83 The issue was a matter of medical judgment,
which amounted to no more than medical malpractice—not cruel and unusual
punishment.84

75. See infra Section II.B.
76. See infra Section II.C.
77. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. This standard applies to government actors including prison doctors in
response to a medical issue, and prison officials or guards in denying or delaying proper access to care.
Id. at 104–05.
78. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.
79. Id. at 105–06 (internal quotations omitted).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 99.
82. Id. at 99–100.
83. Id. at 107. Gamble was also treated for several other medical issues in addition to his back injury,
including heart problems and high blood pressure. Id.
84. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107. Gamble had argued, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
had agreed, that the prison should have done more, like take an x-ray of Gamble’s lower back. Id.
However, the Court rejected that argument, stating: “[T]he question whether an X-ray or additional
diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment is indicated is a classic example of a matter for medical
judgment. A medical decision not to order an X-ray . . . does not represent cruel and unusual punishment.”
Id.
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Since Estelle, the Court has outlined a two-pronged test for deliberate
indifference consisting of an objective and subjective component.85 First, for the
objective component, an inmate must show that the deprivation of a medical need
or condition poses a substantial or a “sufficiently serious” risk of harm.86 Harm
includes both immediate and future threats to an individual’s health or safety.87
For instance, prison officials cannot ignore conditions of confinement that could
cause or contribute to a serious future health issue, like excessive exposure to
secondhand smoke or unsafe drinking water.88
Second, for the subjective component, an inmate must show that a prison
official had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind” when he deprived an inmate
of medical treatment.89 In other words, the official must know of and disregard
an excessive risk to inmate health and safety, thus inflicting cruel and unusual
punishment.90 This state of mind is akin to a finding of criminal recklessness.91
For example, in Farmer v. Brennan, a transexual woman brought a deliberate
indifference action alleging that prison officials knowingly placed her at high
risk for sexual assault when they moved her into general population at a men’s
high-security prison.92 The Court explained that the subjective prong required a
finding that the prison officials knew that the risk to the inmate’s safety existed
when they placed her in general population.93 An official who lacks knowledge
of the risk—even an obvious risk—cannot be found to have inflicted
punishment.94 The subjective prong, in particular, sets a high bar for a plaintiff
trying to bring a successful Eighth Amendment claim.95
The Sixth Circuit has further developed the deliberate indifference test in
its own jurisprudence. For the objective prong, a plaintiff can either show that
the prison failed to provide any treatment for a diagnosed ailment or show that
an ongoing treatment for his or her condition is “so grossly incompetent . . . to

85. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (explaining the two-prong test); Wilson v.
Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1991) (establishing the subjective component for an Eighth Amendment
claim).
86. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298.
87. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) (“It would be odd to deny an injunction to
inmates who plainly proved an unsafe, life-threatening condition in their prison on the ground that nothing
yet had happened to them.”).
88. Id. at 33–35.
89. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298, 300 (“The source of the intent
requirement is not the predilections of this court, but the Eighth Amendment itself, which bans only cruel
and unusual punishment. If the pain inflicted is not formally meted out as punishment by the statute or the
sentencing judge, some mental element must be attributed to the inflicting officer before it can qualify.”).
90. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
91. Id. at 839–40.
92. Id. at 829–30.
93. Id. at 845–46.
94. Id. at 844.
95. Rhinehart v. Scutt, 894 F.3d 721, 738–39 (6th Cir. 2018).
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shock the conscience.”96 To prove subjective recklessness, the plaintiff must
prove that each defendant knew enough of the facts to infer risk to the inmate,
drew the inference, and then disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable
measures to abate it.97
B. HCV Litigation in Other Courts
As a result of the success of DAA treatment, lower courts have been
responding to deliberate indifference claims against prison policies regarding
HCV treatment.98 As courts order injunctions and approve class action
settlements, courts have created constitutional “guideposts” for HCV treatment
in prisons.99 For instance, courts have responded favorably to opt-out testing
policies because this policy requires that when a prisoner first undergoes a
medical examination upon entering a facility, that prisoner must specifically
request to “opt-out” of HCV testing.100 Therefore, opt-out policies allow for
greater comprehensive testing and follow the professional medical guidelines
that endorse broad screening policies.101 Courts also seek some form of
individualized medical treatment and consistent monitoring of inmates who have
tested positive of HCV.102

96. Id. at 737.
97. Id. at 738.
98. E.g., Hoffer v. Inch, 382 F. Supp. 3d 1288, 1314 (N.D. Fla. 2019) (noting the efficacy of DAA
treatment by stating “[i]f it were up to this court . . . every non-contraindicated inmate with chronic HCV
would be immediately treated with DAAs”), vacated in part by Hoffer v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corrs., 973
F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2020).
99. See generally Joshua Kleppin, Note, Making a Deliberate Difference: Creating a Constitutional
Solution to Hepatitis C in Prisons, 8 BELMONT L. REV. 265, 292–98 (2020) (observing HCV litigation
outcomes and how these outcomes can act as guideposts for states to create Constitutional policies through
systematic testing, individualized medical determinations, prioritization based on individual medical
determinations, dedicated funding requirements, and third-party monitoring).
100. See, e.g., Inch, 382 F. Supp. 3d at 1298 (listing “opt-out” testing as one of two options for the
prison to adopt regarding inmate screenings).
101. See id. at 1299–300 (ordering FDC to choose between opt-out testing with an aggressive notice
campaign or to maintain opt-in testing with peer education); HCV Testing and Treatment in Correctional
Settings, in HCV Guidance: Recommendations for Testing, Managing, and Treating Hepatitis C, AM.
ASS’N FOR THE STUDY OF LIVER DISEASE & INFECTIOUS DISEASES SOC’Y OF AM.,
https://www.hcvguidelines.org/unique-populations/correctional (last updated Nov. 6, 2019) (“Prisons
should implement opt-out HCV testing . . . Interventions to reduce HCV transmission and HCV-related
liver disease can only be implemented if infected patients are diagnosed . . . Universal opt-out testing of
inmates for chronic HCV is highly cost-effective and has been shown to reduce ongoing HCV
transmission and the incidence of advanced liver disease.”).
102. See Inch, 382 F. Supp. 3d at 1312–13 (ordering FDC to provide monthly reports that monitor
testing, treatment, and fibrosis levels of inmates); see also Gordon v. Schilling, 937 F.3d 348, 357–61 (4th
Cir. 2019) (finding that a genuine dispute of material fact existed regarding plaintiff’s deliberate
indifference claim when plaintiff presented evidence demonstrating that a reasonable jury could find that
the Virginia Department of Corrections officials had failed to regularly monitor and treat HCV-diagnosed
parole-eligible inmates); Black v. Ala. Dep’t of Corrs., 578 F. App’x. 794, 795–96 (11th Cir. 2014) (per
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Finally, and most contentiously, when individualized and continuous
monitoring are present in a prison’s HCV guidance, courts have upheld
prioritization schemes as a means to deal with finite resources.103 For example,
in Hoffer v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, the Eleventh Circuit
upheld a prioritization scheme that treats inmates with rapidly progressing
symptoms and those in advanced stages of fibrosis with DAAs before allocating
their DAA treatments to inmates in lower stages of fibrosis.104 Although the
Florida policy delayed treatment for individuals in lower stages of fibrosis, the
court emphasized that because the Florida Department of Corrections (FDC)
consistently monitored those individuals for progressing symptoms, the policy
did not violate the Eighth Amendment because prisons are only required to
provide “minimally adequate care” (not “perfect” care).105 As long as the FDC
met the constitutional minimum for care, the prison could weigh cost
considerations in providing HCV treatment.106
C. Inadequate Resources Defense
Although the Supreme Court has never decided on whether state prisons
could use an inadequate resources defense, the Court has briefly raised and
discussed the matter in dicta.107 In Wilson v. Seiter, Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, speculated whether officials, in the subjective prong, could use a
defense that “despite good-faith efforts to obtain funding, fiscal constraints
beyond [the official’s] control prevent[ed] the elimination of inhumane
conditions.”108 Justice Scalia noted that it would be hard to understand how this
curiam) (noting that an inmate received regular monitoring to determine his eligibility for admission to
the “Hepatitis C Treatment Program”).
103. See, e.g., Atkins, 972 F.3d at 740 (holding that a prison could prioritize inmates for DAA
treatment when the prison’s HCV guidance included extensive monitoring and individualized treatment
for each infected inmate, and officials requested budget increases for treatment); Hoffer v. Sec’y, Fla.
Dep’t of Corrs., 973 F.3d 1263, 1272–73 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding that consistent monitoring of F0 and
F1 level patients is enough to meet the constitutional standard of care); Woodcock v. Correct Care
Solutions, No. 20-5170, 2021 WL 2799978, at *5–6 (6th Cir. Jul. 6, 2021) (holding that plaintiffs had
failed to show that the prison’s HCV guidance put them at a substantial risk of serious harm when the plan
provided for regular monitoring, diagnosis, and a flexible prioritization system); Roy v. Lawson, 739 F.
App’x. 266, 266–67 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (explaining that regular monitoring and testing met the
constitutional baseline for treatment as opposed to administering “drugs with a high cure rate”). But see
Pfaller v. Clarke, 630 B.R. 197, 213–14 (E.D. Va. 2021) (“Although the [Virginia Department of
Corrections] Guidelines provided for monitoring these inmates, as the Fourth Circuit taught in [Gordon v.
Schilling, 937 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2019)], monitoring is not treatment. The treatment—the cure—for
Hepatitis C is DAAs.”).
104. Hoffer, 973 F.3d at 1277–78.
105. Id. at 1272–73, 1277.
106. See id. at 1277 (“While it is clear that cost can (and often will) be a relevant criterion in
determining what the Eighth Amendment requires in a particular circumstance . . . it is also clear that cost
can never be an absolute defense to what the Constitution otherwise requires.”).
107. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 301–02.
108. Id. at 301.
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defense could work in a “cruel and unusual punishment” claim because of the
implicit “intent” requirement in the word “punishment.”109 Using funding as an
excuse for poor conditions would undermine the “state-of-mind” component of
this analysis because then the constitutional claim could be subject to economic
considerations.110 Regardless, Justice Scalia set the defense aside noting that a
“cost” defense was not raised nor had there been any indication that other
officials had sought to use this defense to avoid the holding of Estelle.111
In his Wilson concurrence, Justice White responded to Justice Scalia’s
consideration of a cost defense.112 Justice White emphasized that a funding
defense would undermine the deliberate indifference standard because it would
excuse officials from adhering to a constitutional minimum: “In my view, having
chosen to use imprisonment as a form of punishment, a state must ensure that the
conditions in its prisons comport with the “contemporary standard of decency”
required by the Eighth Amendment.”113 Budgetary concerns cannot excuse a
failure to comport with a constitutional standard.114
Lower courts have also advised against an inadequate funding defense.
Writing in dicta, the Eleventh Circuit, in Harris v. Thigpen, disagreed with
allowing financial questions to weigh on the determination of the reasonableness
of inmates’ medical care: “We do not agree that financial considerations must be
considered in determining the reasonableness of inmates’ medical care to the
extent that such a rationale could ever be used by so-called ‘poor states’ to deny
a prisoner the minimally adequate care to which he or she is entitled.”115
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has characterized a lack of resources as an invalid
defense to a claim for prospective relief.116 In Peralta v. Dillard, the court noted,
a “[l]ack of resources is not a defense to a claim for prospective relief because
109. Id.
110. See id. at 301–02 (finding that the intent requirement “cannot be alternately required and ignored
as policy considerations might dictate”).
111. Id. at 302.
112. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 311 (White, J., concurring).
113. Id.
114. See Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 537–38 (1963) (dismissing the city’s argument
that budgetary concerns could allow for the postponement of desegregating local playgrounds); see also
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 855–56 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (arguing that legislatures have a responsibility to
adequately fund prisons and are as culpable as prison officials when prison conditions fail to meet
constitutional standards).
115. Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1509 (11th Cir. 1991); see also Smith v. Sullivan, 611 F.2d
1039, 1043–44 (5th Cir. 1980) (“It is well established that inadequate funding will not excuse the
perpetuation of unconstitutional conditions of confinement.”); Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769
F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985) (“If necessary medical treatment has been delayed for non-medical reasons,
a case of deliberate indifference has been made out.”); Chimenti v. Wetzel, No. 15-3333, 2018 WL
3388305, at *9 (E.D. Penn. Jul. 12, 2018) (finding that when cost was the main underlying factor to further
restrict inmate care, the court could not rule in summary judgment in favor of the prison because the cost
factor may be indicative of a delay in necessary medical treatment for a non-medical reason).
116. Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2014).
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prison officials may be compelled to expand the pool of existing resources in
order to remedy continuing Eighth Amendment violations.”117
A week after the Sixth Circuit decided Atkins, the Eleventh Circuit
considered the issue of cost in Hoffer v. Secretary, Florida Department of
Corrections.118 In Hoffer, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s argument
that failing to provide DAA treatment to all HCV-diagnosed inmates due to cost
is per-se deliberate indifference.119 The Hoffer court framed the issue as
“whether, at what point, and to what extent the cost of a particular medical
treatment should factor into an Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference
analysis.”120 The court expressly embraced that prison officials could consider
cost when determining the type of medical care a prisoner could receive.121 It
noted that that “the civilized minimum level of care required by the Eighth
Amendment is a function both of objective need and cost.”122 In other words,
prison officials may make decisions regarding patient care with cost in mind, but
cost cannot act as a complete defense to adhering to the constitutional floor.123
The court opined, “[e]very minute of every day[,] ordinary Americans forgo or
delay beneficial . . . medical treatment because it’s just too expensive . . .
Healthcare can be expensive—sadly, sometimes prohibitively so. What a topsyturvy world it would be if incarcerated inmates were somehow immune from that
cold—and sometimes cruel—reality.”124 If prison authorities were required to
provide “the best” care for inmates, the court concluded that “prohibiting the

117. Id. (citing Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1134 (9th Cir. 1981)) (“[C]osts cannot be permitted
to stand in the way of eliminating conditions below Eighth Amendment standards.”).
118. Hoffer, 973 F.3d at 1275. Because the court held that the constitutional minimum for adequate
care did not require the FDC to provide DAA treatment for all inmates diagnosed with HCV, the court
never directly addressed a cost “defense.” Id. at 1277.
119. Hoffer, 973 F.3d at 1273–74.
120. Id. at 1275.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1276 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Ralston v. McGovern, 167
F.3d 1160, 1162 (7th Cir. 1999)).
123. See id. at 1277 (“[I]f a particular course of treatment is indeed essential to ‘minimally adequate
care,’ prison authorities can’t plead poverty as an excuse for refusing to provide it.”); Id. at 1286 (Martin,
J., dissenting) (“[N]othing precludes a prison from considering cost, but ‘cost can never be an absolute
defense to what the Constitution otherwise requires.’”); see also Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 730 (7th
Cir. 2016) (“While the cost of treatment is a factor in determining what constitutes adequate, minimumlevel care, medical personnel cannot simply resort to an easier course of treatment that they know is
ineffective.”); Winslow v. Prison Health Servs., 406 F. App’x 671, 675–76 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[Plaintiff]
does not have a constitutional right to unlimited medical care of his choosing, free from all considerations
of cost.”).
124. Hoffer, 973 F.3d at 1277 (citing Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 671 (7th Cir. 1997)). But see
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 (“[E]lementary principles establish the government’s obligation to provide
medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration. An inmate must rely on prison authorities
to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met . . . [I]t is but just that
the public be required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care
for himself.’”).
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state from raising cost as a defense would be inconceivable—and
unsustainable.”125
III. COURT’S REASONING
Writing for a 2-1 majority, Judge Raymond Kethledge first identified the
sole issue on appeal: whether Dr. Williams’s failure to “provide direct-acting
antivirals to every infected inmate amounted to deliberate indifference in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.”126 The court held that the plaintiffs’
argument that Dr. Williams needed to provide DAAs to every infected inmate
failed because, although HCV is a serious medical condition and Dr. Williams
understood the risks of the disease, Dr. Williams took reasonable measures with
the “finite resources” available to him to maximize the treatment of inmates in
his care, and therefore did not consciously disregard the substantial risk that HCV
posed to infected inmates.127
In consideration of this claim, the court accepted that “hepatitis C is an
objectively serious medical condition,” and only considered whether Dr.
Williams consciously disregarded the prisoners’ serious medical needs.128 The
court concluded that Dr. Williams’ changes to the 2019 HCV Guidance—
especially the extensive monitoring and individualized assessment of all
inmates—and his repeated attempts to secure full funding for DAAs
demonstrated that he had not recklessly ignored the risk of HCV.129 Although
the “best practice” was to treat all chronic HCV patients with DAAs, the majority
noted that Dr. Williams’ inability to adhere to this “best practice” did not equate
to a constitutional violation because limited resources prevented him from doing
so.130 Likewise, the court added that the Constitution did not require Dr. Williams
to ask the Tennessee legislature for enough funds to treat all TDOC prisoners
with chronic HCV.131 Rather, his efforts in seeking budget increases to treat his
patients were enough to meet the reasonableness standard under the Eighth
Amendment.132

125. Hoffer, 973 F.3d at 1277.
126. Atkins, 972 F.3d at 739.
127. See id. at 739–40 (detailing the actions Williams took in updating the 2019 HCV Guidance that
the court found reasonable).
128. Id. at 739.
129. Id. at 740.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See id. (noting that the Eighth Amendment does not impose an obligation on state medical
officials to lobby legislatures for “an unspecified quantum of funds, and that failing to ask the legislature
for more money was not even “colorable ground” to reverse the district court). But see id. at 744 (Gilman,
J., dissenting) (finding that nothing in the record showed that Dr. Williams had ever asked for full funding,
despite his testimony that the TDOC Commissioner “never told [him] no” when he asked for more DAA
money).
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A. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Gilman
Judge Ronald Lee Gilman delivered a scathing dissent.133 He argued that
the majority failed to place enough emphasis on the serious harm that would
result in the delay of treatment of HCV to individuals with lower fibrosis
levels.134 He explained that the rationing (or prioritization) scheme failed the
deliberate indifference analysis because the delay of DAA treatment could lead
to an inmate suffering from serious symptoms and, eventually, death.135 Further,
professional guidance on the HCV standard of care no longer endorsed the
practice of prioritization because delaying treatment of HCV results in an
increase in the “patient’s risk of liver-related death two-to-five-fold as compared
to treating the infection at an earlier stage.”136 Dr. Williams’ prioritization policy,
which only provided guidance on treating patients with severe fibrosis, left
patients in a lower stage of fibrosis to needlessly suffer the consequences of
delaying treatment.137
Additionally, the dissent argued that a lack of funding was no excuse for
the prioritization scheme.138 Pointing to U.S. Supreme Court and other circuit
court precedents, Judge Gilman emphasized that cost concerns must not obstruct
the implementation of constitutional rights.139 Therefore, TDOC would need to
make either financial or population adjustments to adequately meet prisoners’
medical needs.140 He also warned that claiming cost as a reasonable
consideration in Tennessee ran contrary to other state decisions that had found
cost to be an unreasonable consideration, and would result in a “patchwork
application” of what constituted cruel and unusual punishment.141 Finally, Judge
Gilman concluded that the inadequate funds excuse fails because the state would

133. Atkins, 972 F.3d at 740 (Gilman, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 740–41.
135. See id. at 741–42 (noting that, since DAAs became available, Dr. Williams had seen 81 inmates
die in his care from HCV).
136. Id. (citing Stafford v. Carter, No. 1:17-CV-00289-JMS-MJD, 2018 WL 4361639, at *17 (S.D.
Ind. Sept. 13, 2018)).
137. Atkins, 972 F.3d at 742.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 742–43.
140. See id. (first citing Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 537 (1963); then citing Peralta v.
Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc); then citing Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370,
1388 (11th Cir. 1982); and then citing Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 502 (2011)) (explaining that other
courts had held that poor financing could not excuse unconstitutional conditions in prisons, and when
prisons could not meet their constitutional burden, it was their duty to release or transfer prisoners “rather
than continuing to subject them to unconstitutional conditions”).
141. Id. at 744 (“By claiming that cost is a reasonable consideration [in Tennessee], Dr. Williams is
essentially arguing that what has been held to be cruel and unusual in Indiana is not cruel and unusual in
Tennessee.”).
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have to deal with the costs of HCV treatment regardless of whether that treatment
is with DAAs or treating prisoners for cirrhosis or liver cancer.142
IV. ANALYSIS
In Atkins v. Parker, the Sixth Circuit held that Dr. Williams was not liable
for deliberate indifference to inmates’ HCV needs under his new 2019 HCV
Guidance because these overhauled practices and protocols sought to best
maximize treatment in a world of finite resources.143 By upholding TDOC’s
prioritization scheme, the Atkins Court incorrectly disregarded the serious
medical needs of prisoners and has dangerously signaled an approval of an
inadequate resources defense. In response, state legislatures must take action to
protect the health and safety of their incarcerated populations. Section IV.A
argues that prioritization schemes are unreasonable measures when
administering appropriate care for HCV. Therefore, the Sixth Circuit incorrectly
concluded that Dr. Williams was not liable for deliberate indifference.144 Next,
Section IV.B addresses the Sixth Circuit’s dangerous signaling that if a state
prison system uses an inadequate resources defense, they will likely prevail.145
Finally, Section IV.C discusses how some states have acted to treat all HCVdiagnosed inmates in their prison systems, and how these legislative and
administrative actions complicate the inadequate resources defense.146
A. The Court Incorrectly Disregarded the Serious Medical Needs of Prisoners
and Professional Medical Guidance in Upholding Dr. Williams’s Prioritization
Scheme.
Because the sole issue on appeal dealt with Dr. Williams’ official actions,
the Sixth Circuit accepted that HCV is an “objectively serious medical
condition.”147 Thus, the Court only addressed the subjective prong, and
concluded that Dr. Williams took reasonable actions in providing medical care
to prisoners with HCV.148 In doing so, the Court wrongly disregarded the serious
medical needs of inmates and professional medical guidance in upholding the
prioritization scheme.
The court—in concluding that Dr. Williams took reasonable actions in
providing medical care to prisoners with HCV by upholding the prioritization
142. See id. (highlighting lower court findings that treating all inmates with chronic HCV now would
likely save the state money when compared to the costly treatments associated with cirrhosis and liver
cancer).
143. Atkins, 972 F.3d at 740.
144. See infra Section IV.A.
145. See infra Section IV.B.
146. See infra Section IV.C.
147. Atkins, 972 F.3d at 739.
148. Id. at 739–40.
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scheme—effectively disregarded the serious medical needs of inmates in the
lower stages of fibrosis. While HCV becomes more dangerous as the disease
progresses, all stages of HCV are substantially serious because delaying
treatment can cause significant damage to the liver and other organs.149 Those
with advanced scarring will require monitoring for liver cancer for the rest of
their lives.150 Likewise, even patients without severe liver scarring can
experience serious symptoms.151 These symptoms can include “depression,
fatigue, sore muscles, joint pain, kidney injury, diabetes or glucose intolerance,
certain types of rashes or autoimmune disease, lymphoma and leukemia.”152
Courts have held that needlessly exposing prisoners to risks of serious harm, even
if the symptoms are not immediately on display, violates the Eighth Amendment
because it “constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain contrary to
contemporary standards of decency.”153 As such, the prioritization scheme
withholds highly effective treatment from individuals who now face significantly
greater health risks.
Similarly, professional guidance indicates that the best practice for treating
HCV is to treat early and treat all diagnosed patients.154 Professional medical
guidance has disbanded the use of prioritization tables in response to clear
evidence that delaying treatment seriously harms people with chronic HCV.155
The plaintiff’s expert testified that the Veteran’s Affairs Administration (VA),
where he had worked, used a prioritization scheme until the VA realized the
long-term benefits of early treatment.156 Likewise, the AASLD/IDSA Guidance
also removed prioritization tables from their treatment guidelines because of “the
many benefits . . . that accompany HCV eradication.”157 Although courts have

149. Atkins, 972 F.3d at 742 (Gilman, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying notes 17–24.
150. Atkins, 972 F.3d at 742 (Gilman, J., dissenting).
151. Id.; see also Chimenti, 2018 WL 3388305, at *12 (finding that inmates with low fibrosis, less
than F2, have serious medical needs because “they may suffer from fatigue and other nonhepatic
symptoms of their infections and, if not treated with DAAs before their disease progresses, may suffer
from liver inflammation, liver fibrosis, liver cancer and liver-related mortality that they would not suffer
if they were treated with DAAs”).
152. Atkins, 972 F.3d at 742 (Gilman, J., dissenting).
153. Helling, 509 U.S. at 32 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104); see also Boretti v. Wiscomb, 930 F.2d
1150, 1154–55 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding that, despite the inmate’s wound healing on its own without prison
medical care, the inmate had stated a claim for deliberate indifference because prison officials had
needlessly denied the inmate relief by not providing daily dressing for the wound and the prescribed pain
medication which was readily available).
154. When and in Whom to Initiate HCV Therapy, supra note 52.
155. Id.
156. Atkins, 972 F.3d at 741 (Gilman, J., dissenting).
157. When and in Whom to Initiate HCV Therapy, supra note 52; see also BOP 2021 GUIDANCE, supra
note 47, at 1, 12 (removing its prioritization tables to reflect the updated AASLD/IDSA guidance).
Notably, the AASLD/IDSA guidance does identify specific populations to help clinicians make more
informed decisions regarding treatment and complications that may arise for those groups. When and in
Whom to Initiate HCV Therapy, supra note 52.
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held that prisons do not need to adhere to the “gold standard” of care in order to
avoid a constitutional violation,158 prison officials must not consciously expose
an inmate to an excessive risk of serious harm.159
While officials may consider cost limitations in determining treatment
options for inmates, delaying treatment is akin to no treatment.160 Inmates have
no other option but to depend on government resources for minimally adequate
treatment for their medical needs.161 Regardless of the stage of fibrosis
progression, DAAs are the only professionally recommended course of treatment
due to their high success rates.162 Despite Dr. Williams’s “extensive monitoring”
of inmates with chronic HCV,163 a prioritization scheme fails as a reasonable
measure to protect inmates from the virus’ progression, and thus falls below the
constitutional “minimally adequate care” baseline.
B. The Atkins Majority Has Dangerously Signaled an Approval for State
Prisons to Use an Inadequate Resources Defense.
The Atkins majority has signaled an approval for state prisons to use an
inadequate resources defense, which could potentially have a dire impact on
public health legal advocacy if courts are willing to justify treatment
prioritization schemes due to lack of funding. In Atkins, the majority agreed that
the premise of the plaintiffs’ “best practice” argument was true, but ultimately
failed because the plaintiffs “demand[ed] that [Dr. Williams] spend money he
did not have.”164 The majority concluded that the U.S. Constitution did not
require Dr. Williams to lobby the legislature for money.165 This conclusion on
the role that limited resources can play in prison health care is broad and openended. The Sixth Circuit is stating that if a prison does not have enough funds,
then as long as that prison is maximizing that budget to meet the constitutional

158. See Rhinehart, 894 F.3d at 750 (“[T]he Eighth Amendment does not require prison medical
providers to provide inmates with ‘unqualified access to health care.’ An inmate is entitled to adequate
medical care, not the best care possible.”); see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107 (explaining that a medical
decision, like not ordering an X-ray, does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment); Dodson v.
Wilkinson, 304 F. App’x. 434, 440 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that continuous testing and treatment since
the inmate’s initial HCV-diagnosis is an acceptable medical judgment under the Eighth Amendment).
159. Rhinehart, 894 F.3d at 738–39.
160. See Helling, 509 U.S. at 33 (explaining that prisons cannot needlessly ignore a condition of
confinement that is very likely to cause serious future health concerns); Pfaller, 630 B.R. at 213–14
(“[M]onitoring is not treatment.”).
161. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 (“An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical
needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met.”).
162. When and in Whom to Initiate HCV Therapy, supra note 52.
163. Atkins, 972 F.3d at 740.
164. Id.
165. Id. But see id. at 744 (Gilman, J., dissenting) (arguing the final reasonable measure that Dr.
Williams never took was to ask the legislature for enough funding to treat all HCV-diagnosed inmates).
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minimum, the prison has met its constitutional obligations.166 This proposition
contradicts the fundamental principles established in Estelle of protecting
prisoners from the deliberate indifference of prison officials.167
Moreover, in consideration of costs in a deliberate indifference claim, the
Eleventh Circuit observed that “ordinary Americans forgo or delay beneficial . . .
medical treatment because it’s just too expensive.”168 The Hoffer Court remarked
that prisoners were not immune to the “cruel reality” of expensive health care.169
This argument is flawed because, unlike prisoners who are at the mercy of the
state, the general population outside of prison can participate in the health care
marketplace.170 Prisoners, by contrast, rely solely on the state and the medical
providers within the prison for their health care. Allowing a state greater leverage
against Eighth Amendment protections places prisoners in an even more
vulnerable position as they continue to rely on the state to provide for their basic
needs.171
C. If Courts Continue to Limit Access to DAAs in Approving Prioritization
Schemes, State Legislatures Must Take Action to Address the HCV Endemic in
Prisons.
Judicial and legislative approval of the “insufficient funds” defense is
dangerous because it would permit Eighth Amendment protections to vary from
state to state based on the ability of state legislatures to provide adequate
funding.172 Notably, several states have secured funding to expand DAA
treatment for inmates diagnosed with chronic HCV. For example, Louisiana,
Michigan, and Washington State have signed “Netflix model” contracts with
pharmaceutical companies.173 Ideally, these contracts will allow states to pay a
166. Atkins, 972 F.3d at 740 (“The plaintiffs in essence demand that he spend money he did not
have.”).
167. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102 (stating that the Eighth Amendment embodies “broad and idealistic
concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency”); see also Gordon, 937 F3.d at 350–55
(finding that an inmate stated a claim when prison officials did not actively treat his HCV-diagnosis for
about seven years due to his parole-eligible status); Hoffer, 973 F.3d at 1282 (Martin. J., dissenting)
(noting that the majority wrongfully overlooked the fact that the lower court had found twice—with no
contention from the Secretary—that “that the only reason [HCV] patients were not treated was due to lack
of funding”).
168. Hoffer, 973 F.3d at 1276–77.
169. Id. at 1277.
170. The author is not arguing that American health care is accessible or affordable, only that outside
of prison a health care marketplace exists.
171. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833 (“[H]aving stripped [prisoners] of virtually every means of selfprotection and foreclosed their access to outside aid, the government and its officials are not free to let the
state of nature take its course.”).
172. Robert Katz, Hepatitis C Litigation: Healing Inmates as a Public Health Strategy, 29 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 127, 142 (2020).
173. Id. at 135; JoNel Aleccia at al., Pharma Sells Washington State and Others on ‘Netflix Model’ to
Wipe Out Hep C. But the Cost is Being Kept From the Public, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 29, 2019, 6:00 AM),
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base annual rate for an unlimited supply of the company’s generic HCV
medication.174 All three states have signed onto the goal of eradicating HCV in
their states, and this model allows them to reach their most vulnerable
populations.175 Other state legislatures have significantly increased their budgets
or are actively debating budget increases to assist in the treatment of prisoners
diagnosed with HCV.176
Similarly, several states have settled class action lawsuits with the promise
of treating all or nearly all patients within their systems.177 For example, in
January 2020, South Carolina had been granted “preliminary” approval for a
proposed settlement that promised testing and treatment for HCV to all inmates
in South Carolina correctional facilities.178 South Carolina’s Department of
Corrections also received ten million dollars in its 2019–2020 budget “to cover
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/health/pharma-sells-washington-state-and-others-on-netflixmodel-to-wipe-out-hep-c-but-the-cost-is-being-kept-from-the-public/; O’NEILL INST. FOR NAT’L &
GLOB. HEALTH L., INNOVATIVE PAYMENT MODELS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROMISE AND PRACTICE OF
NOVEL HEPATITIS C MEDICATION PROCUREMENT STRATEGIES IN THE U.S 6–7 (2021),
https://www.natap.org/2021/HCV/Innovative-Payment-Models.pdf.
174. Aleccia et al., supra note 173; see also Louisiana Launches Hepatitis C Innovative Payment
Model With Asegua Therapeutics, Aiming to Eliminate the Disease, LA. DEP’T OF HEALTH (June 26,
2019), https://ldh.la.gov/news/5181 (agreeing to a base rate to a period of five years); O’NEILL INST. FOR
NAT’L & GLOB. HEALTH L., supra note 173, at 3–7 (describing the Louisiana, Washington, and Michigan
contracts).
175. See O’NEILL INST. FOR NAT’L & GLOB. HEALTH L., supra note 173, at 3–5 (noting that
Louisiana’s goal is 2024 and Washington’s is 2030); LA. DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 174; Aleccia et
al., supra note 173; MICH. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., MICHIGAN’S STATE PLAN ON ELIMINATING
HEPATITIS C 3–4 (2021), https://www.michigan.gov/documents/mdhhs/MDHHS_State_Plan_on_
Eliminating_HCV_Final_Draft_720817_7.pdf (“[T]he overarching goal [is] that Michigan residents will
have equitable access to programs and services to prevent the spread of HCV, which will be a curable
disease for all.”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., VIRAL HEPATITIS NATIONAL
STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE UNITED STATES: A ROADMAP TO ELIMINATION 3 (2020), https://www.hhs.gov/
sites/default/files/Viral-Hepatitis-National-Strategic-Plan-2021-2025.pdf (supporting a goal to eliminate
viral hepatitis by 2030).
176. See, e.g., Adam L. Beckman et al., Follow California’s Lead: Treat Inmates with Hepatitis C,
HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Jul. 24, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180724.
396136/full (“California passed a budget allocating $105.8 million to treat 22,000 inmates with hepatitis
C currently held in its state prisons.”); Seth Klamann, Corrections Department Asks for $4 Million to
Treat Wyoming Inmates With Hepatitis C, CASPER STAR TRIBUNE (Feb. 9, 2020), https://trib.com/news/
state-and-regional/health/corrections-department-asks-for-4-million-to-treat-wyoming-inmates-withhepatitis-c (explaining that Wyoming’s corrections officials asked the state legislature for $4 million for
HCV treatment); Ted Alcorn, ‘Major milestone’: Governor’s Budget Targets Hepatitis C Epidemic in
Prisons, N.M. IN DEPTH (Jan. 16, 2020), http://nmindepth.com/2020/01/16/major-milestone-governorsbudget-target-hepatitis-c-epidemic-in-prisons (noting that the governor “recommend[ed] $30 million in
new funding for the Corrections Department for treatment of [HCV]”); Lisa Backus, Settlement in Hep C
Suit Reached as 500 Inmates Cured, CT NEWS JUNKIE (Jan. 14, 2021, 5:00 AM),
https://ctnewsjunkie.com/2021/01/14/20210114_settlement_in_hep_c_suit_reached_as_500_inmates_cu
red/ (“The legislature approved $20 million for the treatment of Hep-C in the agency’s 2021 fiscal year
budget.”).
177. Katz, supra note 172, at 129–30.
178. Mandated Hep C Treatment for SC Inmates Gets Initial Consent, AP NEWS (Jan. 14, 2020),
https://apnews.com/article/4051e68697444fd48b9dc7f2831b8f78.
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drugs, staffing, equipment and other expenses related to the testing and treatment
for hepatitis C.”179 Other states with similar settlements include Colorado,
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania.180 Although these
settlements provide significant improvements to HCV testing and treatment for
inmates, legislatures are in a stronger position to negotiate with pharmaceutical
companies for better drug pricing options. Likewise, legislatures can look
beyond the immediate issue of HCV treatment to longer term goals of HCV
eradication.181
As more states move to address HCV as a public health issue, the question
remains how an inadequate resources defense may cause discrepancies in
treatment across states as some states will find the funding to treat inmates, while
others will not.182 This disparity highlights a potential problem where an inmate
in one state could receive DAA treatment immediately regardless of fibrosis
level, while an inmate in another state could not receive DAA treatment if the
state implemented a prioritization scheme, claiming inadequate resources.
Moreover, even if courts continue to accept this defense, in the case of HCV
treatment, Netflix model contracts and settlements that mandate treatment for
every diagnosed inmate demonstrate that each state can find funding for DAA
treatment. Thus, not providing those funds is an Eighth Amendment violation.183
V. CONCLUSION
The Estelle Court articulated that the Eighth Amendment protects prisoners
from unnecessary suffering contrary to contemporary standards of decency: “[I]t
is but just that the public be required to care for the prisoner who cannot by reason
of the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself.”184 Contemporary standards of
decency must include the use of a highly effective and curative treatment as

179. Id.
180. Katz, supra note 172, at 129; see generally Kleppin, supra note 99, at 278–79 (explaining the
settlement agreements for Colorado, Pennsylvania, Minnesota, and Massachusetts).
181. See WHO, Hepatitis C, supra note 24 (setting a goal to eliminate viral hepatitis as a public health
problem by significantly reducing new infections and deaths by 2030); HCV Testing and Treatment in
Correctional Settings, supra note 101 (“Returning inmates to their communities cured of chronic HCV
would be an invaluable step toward HCV elimination.”).
182. Compare Hoffer, 973 F.3d at 1272 (“To be clear, ‘some medical attention’ doesn’t necessarily
demand curative care.”), with Pfaller, 630 B.R. at 213–14 (“[M]onitoring is not treatment. The
treatment—the cure—for Hepatitis C is DAAs.”), and LA. DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 174 (explaining
that the goal is to “eliminate” the disease in Louisiana by providing accessible DAA treatment).
183. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 855 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Where a legislature refuses to fund a
prison adequately, the resulting barbaric conditions should not be immune from constitutional scrutiny
simply because no prison official acted culpably.”).
184. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
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opposed to needlessly waiting for advanced liver scarring.185 What a “topsyturvy world” we must live in when individuals at the mercy of state action must
wait and see if the state will elect to cure them.
In Atkins, the Sixth Circuit failed to protect the plaintiffs from unnecessary
suffering in upholding Dr. Williams’ prioritization scheme as a reasonable
measure in his 2019 HCV Guidance. In upholding the prioritization scheme, the
Court minimized the serious medical needs of prisoners and disregarded the
modern standards of care for HCV treatment.186 Atkins also signifies a nod of
approval for an inadequate resources defense for deliberate indifference
claims.187 This approval of an inadequate resources defense is concerning
because the outer limits regarding how a state prison may use the defense remain
undefined.188 Finally, state legislatures must act to protect the health and safety
of their incarcerated populations, and properly care for those individuals who
must rely on state correctional institutions to meet their basic health care
needs.189

185. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., CONSULTATION REPORT: EXPERT CONSULTATION ON
2 (2016) (describing DAAs
as “highly effective” and “curative”).
186. See supra Section IV.A.
187. See supra Section IV.B.
188. See supra Section IV.B
189. See supra Section IV.C.
THE EVIDENCE FOR EARLY HEPATITIS C TREATMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

